

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ISLAM ON UNITED STATES' STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ISLAM ON UNITED STATES' STRATEGY FOR
COMBATING TERRORISM**

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ABSTRACT

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What is the role that Islam plays in the war al-Qaida is currently waging? How significant is that role and how should the United States address this role in its strategy for combating terrorism? These questions will be viewed through a "thinking in time" lens and a "creative thinking" lens. This paper provides an understanding of the enemy and provides recommendations for how United States policy and strategy should address this issue.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ISLAM ON UNITED STATES' STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM

The first task...is to identify the enemy's center of gravity...The second task is to ensure that the forces to be used against that point are concentrated for a main offensive.

—Clausewitz¹

The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism recognizes that terrorism is not a monolithic enemy but the strategy does identify al-Qaida as the vanguard of this threat and the most dangerous manifestation of the enemy.² This is consistent with the 2006 National Intelligence Estimate "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States" which also judged that al-Qaida would continue to be the greatest threat to the United States and its interests.³ With that in mind, this paper will focus on al-Qaida as the enemy and explore the role Islam plays in how al-Qaida prosecutes the current war it is waging and how or if the United States should address that role.

Furthermore, this paper defines "Radical Islamists" as those Moslems who's interpretation of Islam requires them to kill the apostates and infidel and to reestablish the caliphate through "the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing, destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine-gun."⁴ George Weigel may have said it best in his article, *The War Against Jihadism* when he wrote, "That is what we are fighting: jihadism the religiously inspired ideology which teaches that it is every Muslim's duty to use any means necessary to compel the world's submission to Islam. That most of the world's Muslims do not accept this definition of the demands of their faith is true – and beside the point. The jihadists believe this. That is why they are the enemy of their fellow Muslims and the rest of the world."⁵

The United States Army War College lists the characteristics of the current strategic environment as: Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity (VUCA). No single issue represents the essence of these characteristics more than the current conflict with al-Qaida. To the majority of the world's population, Islam itself is extremely complex and ambiguous. The relationship between al-Qaida and Islam is all that, plus volatile and uncertain. The fact that Islam is a religion complete with all the political correctness issues and sensitivities normally associated with those things most cherished by peoples just adds another degree of complexity to the problem.

The epigraph cited at the beginning of this paper, from Clausewitz, serve as a guide for this paper. The paper first seeks to understand the enemy, then to identify his center of gravity, and finally to analyze the current strategy to determine if it properly focuses efforts to effect that center of gravity. There are many indicators that suggest that the radical Islamist way of thinking is influenced greatly by their perception of their history. This being the case, it follows that to understand al-Qaida without an understanding of the history of Islam is practically impossible. Therefore, to understand the enemy and identify his center of gravity this paper will begin with a historical background of Islam and the Arab nation. Following the historical background, the paper will provide some explanation as to why the Islamist hate the Western world, specifically the United States, by looking at it through a "thinking in time" lens. Next, to determine if the current strategy is focused on the enemy's center of gravity, the paper will review the current policies pertaining to the United States Strategy for Combating Terrorism and close with recommendations for United States policy and strategy to counter the threat manifest in the Global War on Terrorism.

History

History appears to be very important to the Islamists and to impact greatly how they view the world and how they think. The importance of history becomes very apparent when examining the many writings, videos, and audio messages of al-Qaida's leader, Osama Bin Laden. From his 1996 Fatwa⁶ to his most recent letters of December 2007,⁷ he frequently refers to the historic past of Islam whether touting its once greatness or highlighting the injustices or persecutions imposed on Islam by the Jews and Christians. In light of the earlier Sun Tzu quote and in an attempt to better understand how the radical Islamist form their world-view and belief structures, it is crucial to gain some understanding of Islam's history. A history that from its beginning is inseparably entangled with the history of Israel.

Arab Muslims trace their heritage and religious beliefs back to Abraham, the last common ancestor between the Arabs and the Israelites. Abraham is considered by Jews and Christians to be the first great patriarch of ancient Israel and the recipient of the Abrahamic Covenant with God. In this covenant, God promises to make Abraham's descendants great in number, to provide them the land of Canaan (present day Israel), and to be their one and only God.⁸ The Muslims also profess to worship the God of Abraham and they hold Abraham in great esteem believing him to be one of the friends and prophets of Allah. It is from this linkage that the Catholic Church can proclaim, "The church has also a high regard for the Muslims. They worship God, who is one, living and subsistent, merciful and almighty, the Creator of heaven and earth, who has also spoken to humanity. They endeavor to submit themselves without reserves to the hidden decrees of God, just as Abraham submitted himself to God's plan, to whose faith Muslims eagerly link their own."⁹

It is well agreed upon by scholars and well supported in early writings that the Israelites were the descendants of Isaac, Abraham's son by his wife Sarah, and that the Arabs were descendants of Ishmael who was Abraham's son by Hagar, Sarah's Egyptian slave.¹⁰ The divergence between the Islamic and the Judeo-Christian historical understanding of Abraham, Ishmael, and Isaac is a critical component contributing to the theological and cultural divide present in the two traditions today. This divide, in no small measure, contributes to conditions that led to the war currently being waged by radical Islam. To better understand this divergence and its impacts the following paragraphs will compare and contrast the two historical views.

The Biblical account of these circumstances is found in Genesis chapters 16-25 and goes as follows. Abraham's wife, Sarah, who is in her late seventies and unable to have children grows impatient and taking matters into her own hands, offers her slave girl Hagar to Abraham so they can produce an heir. Abraham accepts the offer and Hagar becomes pregnant with Ishmael. Prior to Ishmael's birth Hagar has an encounter with the angel of the Lord who tells her "Behold you are with child, and shall bear a son; you shall call his name Ish'mael... He shall be a wild donkey of a man, his hand against every man, and every man's hand against him; and he shall dwell over against all his kinsmen."¹¹ It is interesting to note the wild and violent nature of this prophesy. This topic will be further addressed in a following paragraph.

Genesis chapter 17 takes up the story thirteen years later when the Lord reveals His plan (as opposed to Sarah's plan) for how the covenant will be passed on. The Lord tells Abraham that "...Sarah your wife shall bear you a son, and you shall call his name Isaac. I will establish my covenant with him as an everlasting covenant for his

descendants after him. As for Ish'mael, I have heard you; behold, I will bless him and make him fruitful and multiply him exceedingly; he shall be the father of twelve princes, and I will make him a great nation. But I will establish my covenant with Isaac..."¹²

Isaac is born and Sarah becomes jealous of Hagar and Ishmael and wants them to be cast out. So against his desire but with God's blessings, Abraham casts them out with some provisions and the scriptures state that Ishmael grew up in the wilderness of Paran, which today is called the Sinia. The only remaining Biblical references to the life of Ishmael are when he returns to bury his father and the listing of his descendants.¹³

The previous three paragraphs draw attention to three interesting points in the Biblical accounts related to Ishmael. First, is the prophecy that he will be wild and violent, a leader but not leading peacefully over his people. Second, is God's plan to not pass on His covenant to Ishmael, although Ishmael was Abraham's first born. Third, is that Abraham's relationship with Ishmael's mother was one of master to slave which is a relationship based on submission to the will of the master. Keep in mind these three points, written hundreds of years before the birth of Muhammad, as the paper further explores the history of Islam and ask the question, "Is there anything prophetic about them?"

Drawing primarily from the Qur'an (Surah 2:127-130), and Bukhari's Hadith (Volume 4, Book 55, Number 583) the following Islamic version of Ishmael's story can be derived. Abraham took the infant Ishmael and his mother, who is not named, to a place that is present day Mecca. Mecca is about 600 miles south of Paran where the biblical account indicates that Ishmael and his mother lived after being cast out by Abraham. It was a dry place with no water and Abraham left them there. Ishmael and

his mother were in great need of water and in desperation she ran between the mountains Safa and Marwa seven times in search of help. Eventually, she saw an angel who dug in the earth with his heel (or wing) and water flowed from the ground thus creating the Well of Zam-zam. Abraham visited Ishmael three times while he was at Zam-zam. On the third visit “Abraham said, ‘Allah has ordered me to build a house here,’ pointing to a hillock higher than the land surrounding it.”¹⁴ According to the Qur’an and Hadith, Abraham and Ishmael built what is known as the Ka’ba. It was at this time the Qur’an says, that Abraham prayed, “‘Our Lord! send amongst them a Messenger of their own, who shall rehearse Thy Signs to them and instruct them in scripture and wisdom, and sanctify them: For Thou art the Exalted in Might, the Wise.’ And who turns away from the religion of Abraham but such as debase their souls with folly?” (Surah 2:129 – 130)¹⁵

The significance of the story highlighted in the previous paragraph is huge both to Islam today and in the initial founding of the religion. The story serves to unite a people by the use of such important icons as the Ka’ba, the Well of Zam-zam, and the patriarch Abraham. The Ka’ba is a pre-Islamic temple that, during the time of Muhammad, was a much venerated place for the worship of different pagan gods by the local tribes. Linking the Ka’ba to Abraham had an unifying effect on the local Arab tribes. Today, the Ka’ba is considered the most sacred place in Islam. The world’s largest Mosque, the al-Masjid al-Haram, is built around it; millions of Muslims visit each year during the Hajj; and five times a day all the world’s Muslims face it to pray.

The water from the Well of Zam-zam is what originally brought people to this desolate place in the desert which eventually became Mecca and the commercial

capital for the region. Water is the key to life in the desert and again in linking this central part of the locals' lives to the religion, Muhammad created a unifying force between the people and the new religion. Today, many Muslims consider the water to be blessed and to possess mystical powers. During the Hajj, male pilgrims are required to run or walk between the mountains Safa and Marwa seven times as did Ishmael's mother, then drink the water from the Well of Zam-zam.

Most significantly, the story took the religious figure of Abraham, who was venerated by both the Jews and the Christians, and established Islam as being his true religion. This story also implied that Muhammad was sent as a result of Abraham's prayer for a messenger.¹⁶ It tied the local population to Abraham and his religion through his building of and worshiping at the Ka'ba and by establishing its Arab forefather Ishmael as being a beloved son of Abraham and recipient of Allah's protection.

Thus the Judeo-Christian's believe the Biblical version that God's covenant and plan for salvation runs through Isaac and the Jews who are His chosen people. Where as the Muslims believe the Biblical version is a Jewish corruption of the story which the Quran has corrected, and that Islam is in fact the one true religion which was practiced by Abraham and passed down through Ishmael to Allah's chosen people – the Muslims.

Why They Hate Us

From the time of Muhammad, Islam was both a religion and a way of governance surrounded by violence. Bernard Lewis describes it well in his article *The Root of Muslim Rage*, where he writes that the struggle between Islam and the world has been going on for 1400 years. "It began with the advent of Islam, in the seventh century, and

has continued virtually to the present day. It has consisted of a long series of attacks and counterattacks, jihads and crusades, conquests and reconquests. For the first thousand years Islam was advancing, Christendom in retreat and under threat. The new faith conquered the old Christian lands of the Levant and North Africa, and invaded Europe, ruling for a while in Sicily, Spain, Portugal, and even parts of France. The attempt by the crusaders to recover the lost lands of Christendom in the east was held and thrown back, and even the Muslims' loss of southwestern Europe to the Reconquista was amply compensated by the Islamic advance into southeastern Europe, which twice reached as far as Vienna. For the past three hundred years, since the failure of the second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683 and the rise of the European colonial empires in Asia and Africa, Islam has been on the defensive, and the Christian and post-Christian civilization of Europe and her daughters has brought the whole world, including Islam, within its orbit."¹⁷ The convergence of theological, political and historical differences has engendered persistent conflict between Muslims, Christians, and Jews.

Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) is widely viewed as the father of the present day radical Islamist movement. Prior to his emergence onto the world jihadist stage, little was known about America among most Middle Easterners nor was there much interest. In 1950, Qutb, an Egyptian writer and educator, returned to his home in Egypt after spending 22 months studying in America. Qutb was a passionate Islamic fundamentalist who had deep rooted concerns about the lack of Islamic values in society. His experiences in America appeared to inflame this concern and cultivate an abhorrence

within him for Americans, who he viewed as the leaders of the morally corrupt Western world.

In 1964, Qutb published *Milestones* a radical manifesto that influenced thousands of young Muslims including such people as Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden. This document, more than any other writing, can be seen as the catalyst for the radical Islamic terrorism of today. Qutb inspired a deep hatred for the West and turned the attention of many Muslims toward America as the leader of the Western world and the enemy of Islam.¹⁸

After 9/11 Osama Bin Laden issued a video that reveals some interesting clues to the reasons behind the hatred al-Qaida has for the United States. In this video Bin Laden says, "But if the sword falls on the United States after 80 years, hypocrisy raises its head lamenting the deaths of these killers who tampered with the blood, honour, and holy places of the Muslims... In the aftermath of this event and now that senior US officials have spoken, beginning with Bush, the head of the world's infidels, and whoever supports him, every Muslim should rush to defend his religion... These incidents divided the entire world into two regions - one of faith where there is no hypocrisy and another of infidelity, from which we hope God will protect us."¹⁹

Bernard Lewis, in his book, *The Crisis of Islam* posits that the 80 years Bin Laden references is referring to the time since the 1918 defeat of the last great Muslim Empire, The Ottoman sultanate.²⁰ This defeat marked the end of what was an ever expanding and prosperous Islamic caliphate and ushered in a period of western influence and dominance in the Muslim territories. Bin Laden, like many of his contemporaries, see Islam as being repressed for the last 80 years by Western infidels and deprived of their

rightful place in the world. They believe the caliphate should encompass the world and some have suggested that bin Laden sees himself as the future caliph.²¹

Bin Laden's reference to two regions is very indicative of how they see the world. One region, in which they belong, is defined by a single religion and its people are those who submit to Allah's every will. The other region is the rest of the world. These are the infidels and enemies of Islam who's leader is George Bush.

Current United States Strategy

The current National Strategy for Combating Terrorism was published in September 2006. The document begins with an overview and a description of the enemy. It then provides a strategic vision, followed by the strategy which is divided into two sections - a long term approach and short term priorities. The document closes with a discussion on the institutionalization of long term structures and a short conclusion.

In the overview, the Strategy uses the term "War on Terror" to describe what it is designed to win. The term has two basic faults that further exacerbate the ambiguity surrounding this issue. First, terrorism is a tactic used by the enemy and not the actual enemy with whom the nation is at war. Second, it is broader than it needs to be, meaning that there is a lot of terrorism in the world that is not a threat to the United States nor does it warrant any reason for which the country should declare war.

It is interesting to note the numerous references to religion found in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism's description of the enemy compared to the negligible number of similar references found in the document's vision and strategy portions. For instance, the document has barely over one page devoted to describing the enemy which includes in it thirteen references to religion (seven references to Muslims, four to

Islam, one to Jihad, and one to the word “religious”).²² Compare this to the thirteen pages of vision and strategy in which a mere two paragraphs are devoted to addressing the religious component of this enemy.²³

The short term strategy consists of four priorities of action which are as follows: (1) Prevent attacks by terrorist networks - this consists of conducting kinetic attacks to kill or capture the hard core terrorist, denying terrorist entry into the United States, and defending potential targets against attack. (2) Deny WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them – the strategy list several measure to counter the proliferation of WMD, to deter the use by those who may already have it, and to mitigate the effect of an actual attack. (3) Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states – this priority focuses on the ending of state sponsorship of terrorism through the use of a wide range of tools used to delegitimize terrorism as an instrument of statecraft and disrupt the flow of resources from rogue states to terrorist. (4) Deny terrorist control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror – this consists of measures that prevent terrorists from exploiting physical, legal, cyber, and financial safe havens.²⁴

The United States long term strategy, as described in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, is solely focused upon spreading democracy with the idea that those democratic states will produce inhospitable environments for radical Islamists and the terrorism they use.

Sun Tzu’s quote of, “Know the enemy and know yourself; in 100 battles you will never be in peril”²⁵ can only be true if one’s resulting strategy adequately addresses what is known about the enemy. In the case of the United States strategy for countering

terrorism this does not appear to be the case. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states that the enemy exploits Islam to serve its violent political vision. It describes the enemy in very religious centric terms. However, the Strategy fails to place any emphasis on measures to adequately address this clear and vital relationship the enemy has with Islam.

M.J. Akbar, a leading Indian Journalist, closes his very pro-jihad book, *The Shade of the Swords*, with the thought that military operations against al-Qaida although successful, are not decisive because as he says, "...recruitment is done in the mind. You can not fight a battle in the mind only with special forces and cruise missiles."²⁶ It is this "battle in the mind" to which Akbar refers that points to the enemy's center of gravity. A center of gravity that is of the mind and revolves around an idea. An idea that is an interpretation of a religion. A religion that is its source of power, Islam.

Islam is the pool in which the proverbial fish of radical Islam swim. Al-Qaida derives all its power from this relationship between radical Islam and Islam. The relationship provides inspiration, legitimacy, financing, manning, and a degree of immunity and protection. It is for this reason that this paper posits that the enemy's true center of gravity is the relationship of radical Islam to Islam in general.

Recommendations

If in fact the relationship with a religion is the enemy's center of gravity, then this alone is certainly problematic for the United States. The United States, like the rest of the Western world, has developed an aversion to attributing any issue stemming from a religious source to the religion from which it was derived. In the case of the Islamic terrorist, this aversion provides immunity to criticism that results in an unchecked

advantage in their information warfare campaign. By linking a radical ideology with a mainstream ideology it is more difficult to isolate the aspects that may indeed not be fairly representative of the mainstream religion. Additionally, this aversion can provide sanctuary and venues for assembly and communications. However, the direst consequence of this aversion is the impact it has on the very way the problem is framed and identified. If the enemy and his center of gravity are not properly identified because of an inhibitor such as this then the resulting strategy has no hope of being correct.

The United States Strategy for countering terrorism could very well be a victim of this aversion phenomenon and, therefore, the first recommendation of this paper is that the Strategy should be readdressed to ensure it has the problem right and that the enemy and his center of gravity have been properly identified and articulated.

This recommendation is not intended to devalue the importance of the respect due to each person and his chosen religion. On the contrary, it recognizes the complexity and sensitivities surrounding the implementation of such a recommendation. Every effort must be taken not to offend people to the greatest extent possible but not at the sake of avoiding recognition of the truth and not at the sake of national security.

The second recommendation is that the analysis of the strategy should strive to refine and clarify the problem through the three following proposals.

1. Define the problem as a fight against the radical Islamist organizations that practice "jihadism the religiously inspired ideology which teaches that it is every Muslim's duty to use any means necessary to compel the world's submission to Islam."²⁷

2. Identify the enemy's Center of Gravity as their relationship with mainstream Islam and recognize that failure to distinguish between the two groups can lead to failure in isolating the cause for conflict.

3. Resolve the ambiguity with the term "War on Terrorism" by replacing the term with a more specific term such as "War on al-Qaida" or "War on Radical Islam".

On the topic of planning the total defeat of the enemy, Clausewitz writes, "The first task, then, in planning for a war is to identify the enemy's center of gravity, and if possible trace it back to a single one. The second task is to ensure that the forces to be used against that point are concentrated for a main offensive."²⁸ If in fact the sanctuary relationship with Islam is the center of gravity, then the strategy has failed to focus the main effort on the enemy's center of gravity and the strategy should be adjusted. Identifying this relationship as the center of gravity makes this a war of ideas and the only way to win a war of ideas is to have the better idea. The battleground for such a "battle in the mind" is the Information Operations battleground. The United States has untold capacity to dominate in this medium but has thus far yielded the field to its opponent. To achieve success in this war, the third recommendation is that the United States shifts its main effort to a properly resourced Information Operations Campaign with all elements of nation power supporting this main effort.

The goal of the Information Operations Campaign should be to produce effects that culminate in a win-win solution as an end state. Some of those effects should be: the positive engagement of moderate Islam on the problem; the marginalization of radical Islamist leaders; and the reduction of anti-Western sentiment among Middle Easterners.

The Information Operations Campaign must target moderate Islam to renounce the tactics of terrorism and drive a wedge between them and the Jihadist. This is a tremendous source of power that has thus far been under utilized. The Campaign must find a way to convince moderate Islam that it is in their best interest to engage in a substantial way as a key player in the resolution of this war.

Ideas have no life of their own and rely on charismatic personalities to carry them. Fawaz A. Gerges best articulates the importance of personalities among the radical Islamist movements in his book *The Far Enemy – Why Jihad went Global* when he writes, “In my conversations with former jihadis, one of the critical lessons I have learned is that personalities, not ideas or organizations, are the drivers behind the movement. It is a personality-driven animal that devours idealistic and alienated young Muslims.” The most lethal and violent jihadist factions and cells were led by highly charismatic, aggressive, and daring personalities who captivated and inspired followers to unquestionably do their bidding.”²⁹ These personalities should be target by the Information Operation Campaign to be discredited and delegitimated.

The anti-West sentiment is a huge factor in the equation that must be addressed in the Information Operation Campaign. The West has not been perfect in its policies and actions impacting the Middle East but it certainly does not warrant the extreme anti-West sentiment that is so prominent in the region. The Information Operations Campaign should consider how to mitigate this perception by messages that highlight the myriad of positive contributions of the West. The campaign should strive for reconciliation by turning the tide of the influential information that this Middle Eastern populace is exposed to from negative to positive.

The bolstering of moderate Islam, marginalization of radical leaders, and reduction of anti-western sentiments sets the conditions for a win-win solution where Islamic terrorism is reduced to a pre-Sayyid Qutb level.

Balance is the key to success. As Bernard Lewis posits in his article, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," the struggle within Islam between the fundamentalist and the moderates will be a hard struggle that the West can do little to influence. He writes that, "Even the attempt might do harm, for these are issues that Muslims must decide among themselves."³⁰ Every action taken on the world stage has the potential of unintended consequence. The United States can never allow terrorist to dictate foreign policy to them but a thorough understanding of the Islamist terrorist and a good global situational awareness can allow for a well synchronized plan packaged to accomplish the national objective while mitigating unnecessary and undesired second and third order effects.

The military or kinetic option is unavoidable in those situations involving the radical terrorists that pose a threat and are not responsive to any other instruments of power and can not be sufficiently marginalized through the Information Operations Campaign. However, the successes of any number of military operations will not necessary lead to victory. This option can be, however, counter productive to the long-term strategy. The situation the United States finds itself in is not unlike the topic of discussion in April 1975, when a United States colonel in conversation with a North Vietnamese colonel said: "You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield." The North Vietnamese colonel thought about that for a minute, then replied: "That may be so. But it is also irrelevant."³¹ Military victories alone will not win this war. The forth and final

recommendation is to strive for balance and to make every effort to reduce the use of the military or kinetic option.

Conclusion

What is now misnomered the War on Terrorism is the present day manifestation of the war against Islamic jihad that has been waging for 1400 years. Today that war is waged on the global stage and it possesses all the characteristics of that strategic environment - Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity (VUCA). The sensitivity surrounding religion makes the issue all the more complicated and has been the main contributor to the flawed United States' Strategy for Combating Terrorism. The Jihadist relationship with Islam is the center of gravity for the war al-Qaida is waging and until the United States' Strategy identifies it as such, and appropriately directs its main effort as such, the United States will continue to win the battles but not the war. At its core, this is not a kinetic fight but rather one of ideas. It may never be won in total but the only hope of containing it is to fight it on the Information Operations battle ground. A thorough understanding of the enemy, its history and its perceptions is absolutely essential to developing a sound Information Campaign Strategy. The Strategy must synchronize all aspects of national power and consider the second and third order effects. Lastly, there does not have to be a winner and a loser in this war and the best strategy might be to strive for a win-win resolution.

With that thought, this paper will close with a final quote from Nostra Aetate, "Over the centuries many quarrels and dissensions have arisen between Christians and Muslims, this sacred council now pleads with all to forget the past, and urges that a sincere effort be made to achieve mutual understanding; for the benefit of all..."³²

Endnotes

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 619.

² *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2006), 5.

³ *Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States dated April 2006"*; available from http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf; Internet; accessed 31 January 2008.

⁴ *Military Studies in the Jihad against the Tyrants - The Al-Qaeda Training Manual*, edited by Jerrold M. Post (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2004), 18.

⁵ George Weigel, "The War against Jihadism," *Newsweek* (4 February 2008), 49.

⁶ Osama Bin Laden, *Bin Laden's Fatwa*, August 1996; available from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html; internet; accessed 10 September 2007.

⁷ Sami Yousafzai, Ron Moreau, and Mark Hosenball, "Signed and Delivered," *Newsweek* (4 February 2008), 7-8.

⁸ *Holy Bible*, rev. standard version, 2nd Catholic ed. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 10-11.

⁹ *Vatican Council II*, edited by Austin Flannery (Northport, NY: Costello, 1996), 571.

¹⁰ Raphael Patai, *The Seed of Abraham* (Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 1986), 22-25.

¹¹ *Holy Bible*, 10.

¹² *Ibid.*, 11.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁴ Sahih Al-Bukhari, *Hadith Collection Volume 4, Book 55, Number 583, circa 1860*; available from <http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/055.sbt.html#004.055.571>; Internet; accessed 27 January 2008.

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¹⁶ Patai, 21.

¹⁷ Bernard Lewis, "The Root of Muslim Rage," *The Atlantic* 266 (September 1990): 49.

¹⁸ Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy – Why Jihad Went Global* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 4-6.

¹⁹ Osama Bin Laden, *Bin Laden's Warning*, 7 October 2001; available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1585636.stm; Internet; accessed 15 January 2008.

²⁰ Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam* (New York: Random House, 2003), xvi.

²¹ *Ibid.*, xviii.

²² *Ibid.*, 5-6.

²³ *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, 7-21.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 11-17.

²⁵ Sun Tzu, 84.

²⁶ M. J. Akbar, *The Shade of the Swords* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 213.

²⁷ Weigel, 49.

²⁸ Clausewitz, 619.

²⁹ Gerges, 34-35.

³⁰ Lewis, "The Root of Muslim Rage," 60.

³¹ Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), 1.

³² *Vatican Council II*, 571.

